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The main characteristics of ‘the Swedish model’ are arguably related to the country’s 
knowledge-intensive industry and its advanced welfare state. The purpose of this paper 
is to discuss the historical development of these two features of the Swedish economy. 
The first part looks at industrial development, highlighting both the reasons for the rapid 
industrialization in the late 19th century and the subsequent shift from raw materials to 
human capital and knowledge as the main competitive advantages. The second part 
turns to the development of welfare state, stressing the gradual increase in benefits and 
coverage as well as the emphasis on universal rather than means-tested benefits. The 
final part suggests some policy conclusions for today’s developing countries and 
emerging economies.  
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1 Introduction 
It may be tempting to argue that advanced economies like Sweden are not relevant as 
role models for developing nations: what lessons could a developing country possibly 
learn from an industrialized economy with a generous welfare state? However, Sweden 
has not always been a high income country that guarantees a high level of social 
security for all inhabitants. Instead, industrialization occurred at a relatively late date 
compared to other Western European countries, exports have been dominated by 
primary commodities for most of the past century, and industrial employment did not 
exceed agricultural employment until the 1930s. The welfare state, with universal 
access to education, health care, and other social services, was not realized until the 
1960s. In other words, there are periods in the Swedish development with conditions 
that are comparable to those in many of today’s developing economies. Hence, while 
the current Swedish debate is perhaps irrelevant from a development perspective, it may 
be possible to draw important insights from some of the historical episodes and events 
that formed the distinguishing features of the society we see today.  
The main characteristics of modern Sweden (or the ‘Swedish model’)1 are arguably 
related to the country’s sophisticated and knowledge-intensive industry and its advanced 
welfare state. Both of these features have developed gradually over time, and a 
summary of these development processes may reveal some of the decisive policy steps 
as well as the structural conditions that have made it possible to achieve both industrial 
success and a high level of social welfare. The first of the episodes discussed in this 
paper refers to the industrial breakthrough in Sweden in the late 19th century, and the 
gradual emergence of a knowledge-intensive manufacturing and service industry during 
the 20th century. The most remarkable characteristic of Swedish industrialization was 
arguably that it commenced at a relatively late date, but that it progressed very rapidly 
once it was in motion. In 1870, about 100 years after the advent of the industrial 
revolution in Great Britain, Sweden was essentially still an agricultural economy with a 
per capita income level of about half of that in Great Britain. A few decades later, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, the Swedish industrialization had made a strong 
breakthrough, and companies like Ericsson, AGA, ASEA, Alfa-Laval, and Sandvik had 
already established an international presence, with foreign affiliates across the world. 
The main question in this context is perhaps: how could Sweden achieve such rapid 
industrialization? At the core of this development were raw material-intensive sectors 
like paper and steel. The fact that these industries are still crucially important for the 
Swedish national economy today, when the focus has shifted from natural resources to 
the knowledge economy, suggests another important question: what is the role of 
resource-based industries in the development process?  
The second episode concerns the development of the Swedish welfare state. A very 
large share of education, health care, pensions, and other social services are provided by 
the state and largely financed by taxes. In most cases, the provision of public goods is 
                                                 
1  In this context, we define the ‘Swedish model’ in a very general way, referring to the combination of 
an advanced knowledge-intensive economy based largely on market principles and a comprehensive 
welfare state. There are several more specific interpretations of the Swedish model in the literature, 
focusing e.g. on the so called Rehn/Meidner model for labour market policy (Erixon 2001) or the 
structure of the welfare state (Kangas and Palme 2005).    2
based on universal rules rather than means-testing, so that all residents have equal 
access to social services. Together with the high and progressive taxes levied to finance 
the welfare state, this has made Sweden one of the world’s most egalitarian societies: 
poverty rates are low and the dispersion of personal net income has also been low. The 
publicly financed education system, which includes university education, has been 
particularly important in this context, since it has raised the degree of social mobility. 
The main questions related to this episode concern the growth of the welfare state: when 
did the welfare state emerge, and how has it been possible to create public support for 
the high taxes needed to finance the generous social security system?  
The following section discusses Swedish industrialization and industrial development in 
an historical perspective. From the point of view of development strategy, it appears 
that the combination of benchmarking and early investment in institutional capacity has 
been especially important for growth and competitiveness: in particular, the early stages 
of industrialization benefited greatly from prior investments in institutional 
infrastructure.2 Section 3 turns to a discussion of the welfare state, and argues that it has 
not been the result of any underlying ‘master plan’, but rather developed gradually, in 
line with the needs of industry and society and according to the financial resources 
available from the state budget.3 Section 4 summarizes some of the insights from these 
two historical episodes.  
2  Industrialization and industrial development  
Most studies of Swedish economic history suggest that industrialization commenced 
around the middle of the 19th century, and that the real takeoff occurred some decades 
later, during the 1870s and 80s. Two exogenous events are often highlighted as the main 
triggers of this process. One was the rapid growth of demand from Great Britain, the 
main industrial power at the time. The British export market provided an outlet for 
Swedish raw materials—during the 1850s, mainly grains and timber, and increasingly 
also pulp and paper and iron and steel from the 1870s on—and motivated substantial 
investment in production capacity and trade infrastructure. In addition, export incomes 
created a domestic demand for a variety of other manufactured products, contributing to 
a broadening of the industrial base. The other event was technical progress in pulp and 
paper and steel production. The development of chemical pulp technology after the 
1870s created new opportunities for exploiting the vast forest resources in Northern 
Sweden, and created another export boom. Similarly, the conditions for mining and 
steel production improved dramatically from the late 1870s on, thanks to new 
production technologies. Northern Sweden had abundant supplies of iron ore, but the 
high phosphorus content of the ore had made it unsuitable for steel production until the 
so-called Thomas smelting process was introduced in 1876. This new technology raised 
the value of the Northern iron ore supplies and led to a very substantial export 
expansion during the following decades.  
However, by the time paper and steel production propelled Sweden into the industrial 
era, many important reforms had already paved the way for industrialization: the 
                                                 
2  This section will draw heavily on Kokko (2005). 
3  The section on the welfare state is partly based on Kokko and Tingvall (2008).   3
Swedish economy had started to change in a fundamental manner from the beginning of 
the 19th century. These reforms made it possible for Sweden to seize the development 
opportunities that opened up through subsequent changes in international demand and 
technology. The foundation was, to a great extent, created through conscious policies in 
agriculture and education, although exogenous technical changes also played an 
important role. Policy played a particularly important role by creating substantial excess 
capacity in domestic institutions: given the limited need for knowledge in the pre-
industrial economy, Sweden had more human capital and a more sophisticated 
institutional structure for knowledge management than what was needed. The surplus 
capacity proved to be an essential competitive advantage once the exogenous events that 
facilitated the industrial breakthrough fell in place. 
2.1  Improvements in agricultural efficiency 
The most significant pre-industrial changes took place in the agricultural sector. Up to 
the end of the 18th century, the Swedish agriculture had relied on archaic production 
techniques and harvests were barely sufficient to feed the population. Famines were not 
uncommon: the last widespread famines occurred in the early 19th century. Three main 
changes contributed to a transformation of agriculture that began around 1800, and 
continued throughout the 19th century.  
First, the structure of land ownership was reformed. Traditionally, the land holdings of 
rural families had been divided into several separate strips of land, dispersed around the 
village. The purpose was to make sure that farmland of different quality was distributed 
fairly among all families belonging to the village. However, the fragmented ownership 
pattern also contributed to inefficiency and slow diffusion of innovations, since all 
production decisions—including adoption of new technologies—had to be coordinated 
among the village members. To overcome these obstacles, land reforms were 
undertaken in most parts of the country during the first decades of the 19th century. The 
traditional ownership pattern was broken up, and land was redistributed so that each 
farm got one larger plot instead of the many separate pieces (see Carlsson 1980). In 
some parts of the country (especially in the more fertile southern regions), this also 
meant that villages were broken up: the peasant families moved their houses from the 
village to the center of their own plot of farmland.  
Second, new production techniques were adopted, and agricultural productivity 
increased. This was partly a result of the land reforms—diffusion of new techniques 
became faster when it was not necessary to convince the village majority about adoption 
of new practices—but also related to technical progress in the machinery industry. The 
most important innovations during the early part of the century were better ploughs, and 
after the 1850s, machinery for sowing, harvesting, and threshing also became widely 
used. Furthermore, increasing use of fertilizers made more intensive cultivation 
possible. 
Third, potato became the new staple crop. It had been introduced to Sweden several 
centuries earlier, but its breakthrough did not come until the end of the 18th century—
before that time, potatoes had mainly been used as animal feed. Potato was well-suited 
to Swedish conditions, and it yielded larger harvests than the traditional staple foods, 
beets and turnips.    4
One result of the changes in the agricultural sector was a marked improvement in food 
supply. Together with improvements in health care and medicine (and a long period of 
peace beginning in 1809), this led to rapid population growth. During the first 60 years 
of the 19th century, the Swedish population increased from 2.3 million to about 4 
million. The area of farmland grew from 1.5 million hectares in 1800 to 2.6 million 
hectares in 1850 and 3.6 million hectares in 1900 (Larsson 1991). Agricultural 
productivity grew continuously, and output sufficed to feed both the farmers and a 
growing urban population. In fact, Sweden became a significant exporter of cereals in 
the 1850s, after having been a steady net importer of grains until the 1830s. Hence, the 
increase in agricultural productivity facilitated the transfer of labour to urban 
occupations and generated export earnings that could be used for investments in forestry 
and manufacturing. The increasing rural incomes also translated into demand for the 
goods produced in the emerging manufacturing industries. 
The domestic manufacturing industry was quick to respond to this increase in demand 
from the very beginning. It is possible to identify at least two strong explanations for the 
rapid supply response. One reason was that some primitive manufacturing activities—a 
kind of proto-industrialization—had begun several centuries earlier and created various 
skills and expertise that were highly useful for the industrial era. This included, for 
instance, the framework for the Swedish army’s procurement of supplies and 
equipment. Cloth, uniforms, weapons, utensils, tobacco, and alcohol were produced by 
so called manufaktur companies, some of which were relatively large (although their 
production methods were primarily based on handicrafts). They provided important 
elements of industrial culture, and the towns where the manufaktur firms were located 
had an advantage over other locations after the advent of the industrial revolution.  
Due to the highly seasonal nature of Nordic agriculture, rural households had 
traditionally produced significant amounts of handicrafts during the winter months: 
leather goods, textiles, shoes, and simple tools were made by most families. After 1800, 
this production increased and became more specialized, both because of population 
growth and because demand was growing due to the higher incomes. In some parts of 
the country, merchants purchased a large share of the output, and they sometimes 
commissioned the production of entire villages. The main significance of this type of 
activity may have been the development of commercial skills. As modern technologies 
for the production of textiles became available after the middle of the 19th century, the 
Swedish textile factories were often established by the same merchant groups that had 
been involved in the trade with handicrafts. 
A related development was apparent in mining and forestry. Swedish producers had 
strong positions in the European markets for copper, iron, and tar already from the 17th 
century, and it has been argued that one of the most important skills learned during the 
early years was international marketing (Hallvarsson 1980). Many of these merchant 
and trader families were also involved in the establishment of the new ironworks and 
sawmills that were created during the 19th century. Hence, some important elements of 
industrial culture were in place already before industry was. 
2.2  Education and technical skills 
An even more important determinant of industrial success was the increase in the level 
of education and human capital that had started well before Sweden entered the 
industrial revolution. Like the institutional changes in agriculture, this was also a result   5
of conscious policies. Both formal and informal types of education and training were 
supported by the state and various private interests. The perhaps most important step 
was the introduction of a mandatory school system in 1842, which proved crucial for 
the creation of a skilled human capital base and for the dissemination of new 
technology. The official ambition was to guarantee basic skills in reading, writing, and 
arithmetics to all citizens, and literacy rates reached nearly 100 per cent within one 
generation. This was essential for the ability of individuals and firms to learn and adopt 
new knowledge: much elementary learning and technology transfer was based on 
written instructions, like blue-prints and handbooks. 
Concurrently, there were important changes in higher education. At the summit of the 
formal education system were the old universities in Uppsala and Lund, established 
already in the 15th and 17th centuries. These expanded throughout the 19th century, 
with heavier emphasis on natural sciences than earlier (when law and theology had been 
the dominant subjects). The great increase in the number of professorial chairs during 
the period when industry started developing rapidly, in particular between 1870 and 
1914, was arguably of ‘immense importance’ for the industrial breakthrough (Ahlström 
1993). Several institutions for advanced technical education were also founded outside 
the traditional universities during first half of the 19th century. The Technological 
Institute in Stockholm was established in 1826, and it became the Royal Institute of 
Technology in 1877. In Gothenburg, the Chalmers Technical School was set up in 1829, 
and it provided scientific and technical education at a university level already from its 
inception, although it was not formally named a Technical University until 1937 
(Ahlström 1992). Technical colleges were established in several Swedish cities—
Malmö, Borås, Örebro, and Norrköping—during the 1850s. Numerous vocational 
training schools were also set up in various parts of the country from the same time, to 
number about 35 at the end of the 19th century and 66 in 1908–9 (Ahlström 1992). The 
guild system was abolished in 1846, and the training schools quickly began to replace 
apprenticeships as the main form of vocational education. Most of the vocational 
schools depended on private initiatives, although some were financed by the state. 
Among the latter were nautical training schools (from 1842), forestry secondary schools 
(from 1860), and agricultural colleges (from 1887) (Nilsson and Svärd 1991). The 
state’s engagement in this area increased further from the early 20th century on, and 
vocational schools have been important tools for the upgrading of labour skills ever 
since that time. 
Parallel to the development of formal education, other institutions also appeared that 
were involved in the development of technology and industry. The Royal Swedish 
Academy of Science dated back to 1739, and the Swedish Ironmasters’ Association was 
established in 1747. The Ironmasters’ Association, which was partly state-financed, was 
particularly important for the transfer of foreign technology to Sweden. The Association 
started the publication of the mining science journal Annalerna in 1817, and financed a 
very large number of foreign study trips made by Swedish engineers and scientists, 
requiring detailed written reports that were made available to the rest of the Swedish 
industry. Several new organizations emerged during the 1860s, e.g. the Swedish 
Association of Engineers and Architects and the Stockholm Engineering Association. 
The Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences, the Wood Pulp Association, and the 
Swedish Institute of Metal Research were added in the early 20th century. These 
institutions were closely in touch with scientific research and technical education, and 
they played—and continue to play—a significant role for the diffusion and 
dissemination of technical skills. New engineering workshops, like Motala Verkstad,   6
established for the construction of lock-gates and iron bridges for the Göta canal 
network in the early 19th century, were also indispensable as training centers. In 
addition, it is necessary to note the importance of labour migration. Swedish engineers 
were often trained and educated in Great Britain and Germany, and important 
contributions were made by several British engineers that immigrated to Sweden (Schön 
1982).  
It is difficult to find accurate measures of the importance of these different types of 
investment in skills and human capital. However, it is clear that the supply of skills 
increased steadily from the 1850s on. The number of engineers educated at the higher 
technical institutes amounted to about 700–800 in 1850, and some 2,000 in the late 
1890s. The number of engineers with secondary education also reached about 2,000 at 
the end of the 19th century (Ahlström 1992). Before the industrial breakthrough, these 
resources could not be fully exploited in Sweden—consequently, many engineers 
emigrated to the United States in search of qualified jobs—but they provided a strong 
competitive edge for the development of industry once the other conditions for 
industrialization were in place. Moreover, the technical skills often translated into 
entrepreneurial success. The founders and leaders of several of the most successful 
Swedish companies were educated at the technical institutes and had received foreign 
training that was paid by the state or some of the institutions mentioned above. For 
instance, Hans Tore Cedergren, who played a central role for the emergence of the 
Swedish telephone industry, and Gustav de Laval, founder of AB Separator in 1883 
(known as Alfa-Laval from 1963) were educated at the Technological Institute of 
Stockholm. Gustav Dalén, manager and chief engineer of AGA, was a graduate of 
Chalmers, and Sven Winquist, founder of SKF, had been educated at the technical 
college of Örebro. Lars Magnus Ericsson, the founder of the telephone company still 
carrying his name, had received state grants for studying the electrical engineering 
industry in Germany and Switzerland company, as had most other leading industrialists 
in the country. Ahlström (1992, 1993) argues that the successful innovators and 
entrepreneurs illustrate that there existed a network between the technical institutions, 
industry, and government already from the middle of the 19th century, and that this 
contributed significantly to the success of Swedish industrialization. It was of central 
importance for the development of industry, especially after the 1880s, when products 
became more differentiated and goods such as pulp, paper, and engineering products 
became more important.  
In addition to the institutional changes in education, it is appropriate to note that there 
were other institutional changes that preceded industrialization but turned out to be of 
utmost importance for developments once the industrial takeoff commenced. One of the 
most significant changes was a restructuring of the state’s forest holdings in the mid-
19th century. Large amounts of forest land were distributed to private owners, 
especially in southern Sweden, and the structure of forest ownership was registered. 
This meant that property rights were well-defined, and the private owners were in a 
position to respond rapidly to the increasing export demand that emerged some years 
later. Another notable event was the introduction of limited company laws in 1848. This 
made it possible to raise more capital and take risks, which was necessary as the rate of 
technical change increased during the second half of the century. Earlier, most firms had 
been owned or at least dominated by one single family, and the owners were personally 
responsible for the firm’s debt (Larsson 1991). Limited companies—where the owners’ 
stake was limited to their share of the firm’s initial capital—employed 45 per cent of the   7
industrial labour force in 1872, and 80 per cent of the labour force in 1912 (Hallvarsson 
1980). 
2.3  The industrial breakthrough 
While the productivity increases in agriculture and the advances in education and 
human capital development were essential prerequisites for industrialization, there is no 
doubt that the immediate trigger for industrialization was a boom in foreign demand for 
Swedish products. This occurred in several steps, starting in the 1850s with grain and 
sawn wood as the main export commodities, and continuing during the 1870s and 1880s 
with pulp and paper, iron ore, and steel as the dominant products.  
Exports of grains were of tremendous importance for the industrialization process, 
although their origin was in the agricultural sector rather than in the manufacturing 
sector, and although the era of grain exports lasted only from the 1850s to the 1880s. 
One reason was that the expansion of agriculture during these decades provided 
employment for the increasing population at a time when industry was not sufficiently 
developed to absorb enough employment. Another reason, already mentioned above, 
was that export incomes created demand for a variety of domestic manufacturing 
products in the early stages of the industrialization process. In addition, export incomes 
were also used to finance important parts of the early industrial expansion.  
Sweden had been a net importer of cereals until the 1830s, as noted earlier, and exports 
were still limited during the late 1840s, reaching some 40,000 barrels annually. At the 
peak, 30 years later, exports had grown to 4 million barrels per year (Carlsson 1980). 
The reasons for the grain boom were largely to be found outside of Sweden. Demand 
was high, especially from Great Britain, where the industrialization process had taken 
off and domestic cereal production was not sufficient to feed the growing urban 
population. Bad harvests in England and elsewhere on the European continent during 
the early 1850s increased the demand further. At the same time, Swedish harvests were 
unusually plentiful. Moreover, the leading European grain exporter, Russia, was hit by 
the Crimean War in 1853–6, and Russian exports ceased almost completely. 
The successful Swedish response to this new export opportunity was made possible by a 
relatively responsive agricultural sector (that had been created by the institutional 
changes in the structure of land ownership) and the appearance of various technical 
innovations that increased productivity, e.g. machinery for sowing, harvesting, and 
threshing (which could be quickly diffused across the country thanks to the improving 
levels of education and technical skills). Sweden managed to hold on to large shares of 
the English grain imports until the 1880s, but the trade disappeared as suddenly as it had 
emerged. The reasons were that Russian exports resumed at large scale, and the United 
States emerged as the new leader when the Great Plains had been taken into production. 
From the 1850s, there was also an increase in the demand for forest products—mainly 
pit props and sawn wood—fed by the British urbanization. Swedish exports of sawn 
wood products had been insignificant before the 1840s, for several reasons. Norway was 
a stronger exporter, both because of shorter transport costs and because the technical 
level of Norwegian sawmills was higher. In addition, the English Navigation Acts gave 
preferential treatment to Canadian producers (Carlsson 1980). However, the situation 
changed very rapidly in the early 1850s. The English import protection was abolished, 
and the Norwegian forest resources were over-exploited, which gave ample   8
opportunities for Swedish wood exporters to step in. The increase in demand motivated 
investments and technical improvements—for instance, steam-powered saws were 
introduced—and sawmills became more efficient. Norwegian entrepreneurs actually 
played an important role in this process, as several companies moved to Sweden 
because of the dwindling forest supplies in Norway. As a consequence, exports of sawn 
wood increased from less than 200,000 m
3 in the 1830s to 4,800,000 m
3 at the end of 
the century. In the 1870s, wood products had grown to make up 43 per cent of Swedish 
exports (Hallvarsson 1980).  
Some decades later, there were new export booms for pulp and paper and iron and steel. 
Exports of pulp and paper started growing from the 1870s, and Sweden had become the 
world’s largest pulp exporter by 1913. This expansion differed from the sawn wood 
boom in several ways. Sawmilling had been an easy start, since the capital requirements 
were low and the technology was simple. Pulp and paper production was significantly 
more capital- and technology-intensive, and posed much tougher requirements on 
domestic institutions and technological competence than sawmilling had done. 
Domestic policies were also much more important for the success of the industry. 
Thanks to the development of a relatively efficient banking system, profits from 
sawmills could be channeled to finance the expansion of pulp and paper mills. At the 
end of the 1870s, the Swedish financial system comprised 35 commercial banks with 
offices in 160 cities, which was comparable to the most highly developed nations in the 
world at that time (Larsson and Olsson 1992). The development of domestic 
technological capability had also proceeded far enough to allow production and exports 
of more advanced goods. In fact, Swedish inventors had taken the lead in the 
development of pulp technologies, and the world’s first chemical pulp factory was 
established in Bergvik, on the coast of Norrland, in 1872.  
The mining industry that started expanding during the last decades of the century was 
also heavily dependent on modern technology. Sweden had held a strong position in the 
international market for metals for several centuries. The main export product until the 
middle of the 19th century was bar iron. The production of iron was strictly controlled 
by the state, in order to avoid deforestation and degradation of forest resources: the 
industry used massive amounts of timber in the form of charcoal. It has been estimated 
that the mining industry’s use of wood was four to five times larger than wood exports 
as late as 1854. Hence, exports of iron ore and pig iron (which were low value added 
products) were restricted. These strict rules were liberalized in the 1850s, when 
technological innovations—the Bessemer and Martin processes—made it possible to 
use coal and coke instead. However, the Swedish production and exports of iron and 
iron ore stagnated during the decades after 1850, because the comparative advantage of 
the Swedish iron industry had been the abundant supply of charcoal. Instead, coke and 
coal-based steel production in continental Europe expanded rapidly. It was not until the 
so-called Thomas process for the production of steel was introduced in the late 1870s 
that the industry started recovering. It was known since centuries that there were rich 
iron ore deposits in Northern Sweden (Lappland). These had not been exploited earlier 
because of their high content of phosphor, which made the steel weaker. Now it became 
economically viable to develop the industry, and new ironworks were established. 
Production of steel for domestic use increased rapidly, but exports of steel remained 
relatively low during the first decades of the industry’s development. Instead, iron ore 
was exported directly to the main iron and steel plants in Germany and Great Britain.   9
The development of mechanical and engineering industries, which started during the 
latter part of the 19th century, was also driven by technological innovations, but these 
were more directly connected to domestic capabilities and skills. Especially the 1880s 
proved to be a golden decade for the Swedish industry, when several path-breaking 
innovations were presented, and when industrialization really took off: the number of 
industrial workers increased by 66 per cent between 1880 and 1889 (Hallvarsson 1980). 
Examples of long-lived Swedish firms that were established during the late 19th century 
or the first years after the turn of the century are Ericsson, Alfa Laval, ASEA, AGA, 
Nobel, Sandvik, and SKF. Table 1 illustrates the changes in the structure of Swedish 
exports between 1881–5 and 1911–3. The relative importance of sawn wood and cereals 
fell, whereas more advanced products, like pulp and paper, engineering products, and 
iron ore became more important. 
Table 1: The structure of Swedish exports, 1881–5 and 1911–3 




Sawn wood  40  26 
Iron and steel  16  9 
Cereals 12  1 
Butter 6  6 
Pulp and paper  5  18 
Engineering products  3  11 
Iron ore  -  8 
Other 18  21 
    
Total 100  100 
Source: Larsson and Olsson (1992: Table 3). 
While the export demand was the driving force behind the early stages of industrial 
development until the late 1860s, the domestic market became gradually more important 
after that, partly as a result of explicit policy intervention. One example was the 
development of domestic infrastructure. Heavy investments in railroads (especially 
during the 1870s) and the introduction of electric energy (from the 1880s) made it 
possible to specialize production and transport raw materials and finished goods across 
the country. The earliest industrial developments, e.g. in sawmills, had relied on 
waterways, but now a more general industrialization, based on the domestic markets, 
was possible. The demand for metal and wood generated by the construction of 
infrastructure facilities, mainly railroads, also stimulated domestic demand. 
Another reason for the heavier emphasis on the home market was even more directly 
related to policy. The export booms during the early stages of the industrialization 
process took place at a time when economic liberalism and free trade ideologies reached 
a first peak. This meant not only that Sweden could freely sell primary products to the 
rest of Europe, but also that Sweden imported much of advanced consumer and 
investment goods from the industrially more developed countries in Europe. These 
policies changed from the late 1880s, when a wave of protectionism swept over Europe. 
Both agricultural and industrial imports were restricted, and the average tariff level in 
Sweden before the First World War reached about 15 per cent of value added. A further   10
sign of the changing policy climate was the introduction of policies to limit foreign 
ownership of Swedish resources. Earlier, foreign participation and investment had been 
welcomed. This meant that domestic markets became more important, since similar 
developments occurred in the rest of Europe as well. 
One can only speculate about the significance of the timing of policy regimes. It appears 
that Sweden was fortunate, in that the inward-looking policies were not introduced until 
there was a firm base for domestic development. Agriculture had expanded and the 
increased productivity created incomes and demand for various types of consumer 
goods. Technological skills had been developed, which facilitated the creation of a 
variety of import substituting industries. The export success had brought in foreign 
capital, and a foundation for a more comprehensive industrialization was in place. In 
many of today’s developing countries, the experiences of import substitution are 
significantly less positive. One reason could be that the knowledge requirements in 
modern industry are far higher than they were at the end of the 19th century. While 
Sweden was able to create a human capital base that was sufficient to absorb foreign 
technologies and develop domestic innovative capabilities, few developing countries 
have similar capacities today: the dependence on foreign knowledge and technology is 
far higher. Unfortunately, the human capital and knowledge resources in many 
developing countries are too low even to use foreign technologies efficiently. It is 
significant that many of the major development successes in recent decades—China, 
South Korea, Taiwan—are also countries that have invested very substantially in human 
capital and knowledge, both domestically and by sending hundreds of thousands of 
students for higher education to the USA, Europe, Japan, and Australia.  
The importance of chance is also reflected by the sizable Swedish migration to America 
during the second half of the 19th century. This made it possible to urbanize at a rate that 
was consistent with industrial development. It is estimated that a quarter of the Swedish 
population (1.2 million people) emigrated between 1850 and 1910. As a result, Sweden 
avoided the worst problems related to rural poverty and mass unemployment: it is also 
likely that this helped avoid political problems caused by polarization between left and 
right (see Haavisto and Kokko 1991). 
2.4  Sustaining success in raw material-intensive sectors: the forest industry  
The rapid expansion of Swedish industry after the 1870s depended crucially on 
favourable initial conditions in the form of an institutional structure that was more 
sophisticated than required to maintain the country’s income level: for example, 
Sandberg (1979) refers to Sweden before the First World War as an ‘impoverished 
sophisticate’. The resulting excess capacity in the innovation system facilitated learning, 
knowledge development, and commercialization of innovations, and made it possible to 
quickly grasp the opportunities that emerged as a result of unforeseen technical 
breakthroughs during the second half of the 19th century. The importance of most of the 
elements making up the Swedish institutional environment at that time—property rights, 
education, rules and regulations, incentives, and outward orientation—is commonly 
recognized. However, excess capacity is not commonly proposed as a characteristic of 
successful innovation systems. Instead, it is often seen as an indication of inefficient 
investment decisions and wasteful use of resources. This raises the question to what 
extent the experiences from the Swedish industrialization process can be generalized. 
When is it motivated to invest in excess capacity and is excess capacity needed to 
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A look at the innovation system contributing to the sustainability of the Swedish forest 
industry may provide some tentative answers. The industrial breakthrough for the 
industry started between the 1850s and 1880s, with an export boom for wood products, 
as discussed above. From the 1880s, after the introduction of chemical pulp technology, 
pulp and paper emerged as another core export sector. Today, some 130 years later, the 
forest sector remains a prominent part of the Swedish economy. Sweden is among the 
world’s five largest exporters of paper and the third largest exporter of sawn wood 
products. The net exports of forest products (gross exports minus the sector’s import 
value) are larger than the aggregate net exports of automobiles, electronics, telecom, 
and pharmaceuticals. Altogether, the forest industry also accounts for some 13–4 per 
cent of value added and employment in the Swedish manufacturing sector. The 
industry’s production technologies have steadily grown more sophisticated, enterprises 
have specialized in processes with strong economies of scale, and shifted their focus 
towards new products with higher value added. As a result, labour productivity has 
grown fast enough to match the continuous increases in labour costs: this has allowed 
the industry to maintain its competitiveness in an environment where technologies, 
competition, and demand conditions have been changing continuously.  
The ability to adjust and restructure successfully has depended crucially on the 
institutions and human capital created by the forest industry’s innovation system, just 
like the success of Swedish industrialization depended on the national innovation 
system built up prior to the industrial takeoff. However, there are some notable 
differences between the two cases. While the specific technological innovations leading 
up to the industrial breakthrough were in principle impossible to foresee, it has over 
time been possible to identify the main challenges for the forest industry. These are 
related to the protection of the raw material base and the development and 
dissemination of the new technologies and skills needed to survive in a changing world. 
Identifying the key challenges has allowed a concentration of institutional resources to 
handle these issues and reduced the need to maintain excess capacity in areas that are 
not of central importance. One example is forest management, it was recognized early 
on that a depletion of the raw material supply was a serious threat to the sustainability of 
the industry: the demise of the Norwegian wood industry in the mid-19th century 
illustrated the dangers. The first modern forestry laws were therefore introduced already 
in 1903 and mandated replanting after each harvest. Over time, the forestry laws have 
come to cover additional objectives, such as environmental considerations. Today, all 
forest owners are required to prepare a forestry plan, outlining expected thinning, 
felling, replanting, and other operations. The regulations and requirements are combined 
with fiscal incentives and training and extension services provided by the public sector 
as well as cooperative forest owners’ organizations. The cooperatives are especially 
important for the diffusion of new technologies among forest owners: in addition to 
education and training, they also provide forest management services to the growing 
group of owners that has moved to the cities and lack both the time and skills to actively 
work on their lands. The results of these targeted institutional investments have been 
highly successful. The growing stock of timber in Sweden is estimated to be at least 
twice as large as one century ago, when the first laws requiring replanting were 
introduced, and the stock is still growing. Similar institutional investments have been 
made in knowledge creation and management, as will be discussed shortly. 
Another distinguishing feature of the forest industry’s innovation system is that it has 
not been able to draw heavily on experiences from other countries, since Sweden has 
been one of the industry’s technological leaders since the late 19th century. To maintain   12
its leading position, Sweden has therefore been forced to invest more in R&D with 
uncertain returns than countries that have been able to benefit from technological 
benchmarking and convergence. Moreover, to stay in the lead, it has been necessary to 
maintain a readiness to respond faster than others to changing market conditions. Taken 
together, these requirements have translated into a need for excess capacity in skills and 
knowledge. 
A sophisticated network or cluster of organizations involved in the development of new 
technology, knowledge, and skills has therefore emerged over time, and has become the 
main competitive advantage of the Swedish forest sector. This network—which 
corresponds roughly to Lundvall’s (1992) narrow definition of an innovation system4—
included at its peak in the late 20th century well over 100 highly specialized research 
and training institutes in a wide array of fields covering the entire value chain from the 
forest to the final consumer. Taking the pulp and paper sector as an example, Table 2 
illustrates some of the core institutions in the sector’s innovation system at the end of 
the 20th century: since that time, the number of organizations and institutions has 
diminished as a result of several mergers.5 The table distinguishes between two 
dimensions of the system (see Ds 1991: 62). One dimension focuses on the outputs of 
the innovation system, which can be skills or knowledge. Skills are embodied in people 
and generated through various types of education and training. Knowledge is a public 
good that is generated by research and development activities, and can be transferred 
from person to person through various means of communication—lectures, scientific 
articles, handbooks, manuals, and so forth. The other dimension distinguishes between 
institutes and organizations that create skills and knowledge and those that disseminate 
skills and knowledge: while there is some overlap, these are distinctly different tasks 
that are typically undertaken by different actors.  
The main characteristic of the pulp and paper industry’s innovation system is that all of 
the four functions of the innovation system illustrated in Table 2 are strongly 
represented. This is one of the great strengths of the industry, and contributes not only 
to technical progress and innovations, but also to the efficient dissemination of 
innovations. Another feature is that the investments in this knowledge cluster are 
increasingly concentrated and coordinated. The high fixed costs in the pulp and paper 
industry have acted as entry barriers and contributed to the emergence of an 
oligopolistic market structure, where mark-ups are high enough to allow large corporate 
investments in R&D. Much of the research and training taking place in universities and 
the industry’s research institutes is conducted in various networks and other 
collaborative arrangements, often including participation from the industry. 
Regarding the creation of education and skills, most of the leading Swedish universities 
provide university training for engineers specializing in pulp and paper processing and 
related fields. Since the mid-1990s, the universities also have a network for 
postgraduate education in collaboration with the main industrial research institutes, the 
                                                 
4  The narrow definition of an innovation system refers to the ‘organsations and institutions involved in 
searching and exploring – such as R&D departments, technological institutes and universities’. See 
Lundvall (1992: 12).  
5  For example, The Pulp and Paper Research Institute merged with the Swedish Packaging Research 
Institute in the late 1990s, and changed its name to Innventia in 2009.    13
Pulp and Paper Research Institute (PPRI) and the Institute for Surface Chemistry. This 
network is known as the Forest Products Industry Research College (FPIRC) and 
includes all Swedish universities with specialized PhD level education in pulp and paper 
technology. As a result, there is a sufficient supply of highly educated manpower for the 
pulp and paper industry. About half of the engineers recruited by the industry have 
formal training focusing on pulp and paper technology, but the increasingly 
sophisticated production technology requires an increasing number of specialists from 
other fields as well. Partly for that reason, the PPRI itself manages shorter specialized 
training courses for industry professionals. In addition, the institute is actively involved 
in the various academic programmes by financing student research projects, arranging 
guest lectures, and providing lecture rooms and equipment.  
Table 2: Participants in the knowledge cluster of the paper and pulp industry 
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Swedish Packaging Research 
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Institute of Surface Chemistry 
Graphical Research Laboratory 
Swedish Packaging Research Institute 
Swedish Newspaper Mills’ Research 
Laboratory 
Note:   FPIRC is a network of all Swedish universities providing higher education in pulp and paper 
technology. The members include the Royal Institute of Technology, Chalmers University of 
Technology, Lund Institute of Technology, Linköping Institute of Technology, Umeå University, 
Luleå University of Technology, Mid Sweden University, and Karlstad University. 
The universities participating in the FPIRC also account for a sizable share of the non-
corporate research activities in the pulp and paper sector. Most of the basic research 
originates in the university system, in the form of Master’s and PhD projects as well as 
research by regular academic staff. PPRI is the other major research producer in this 
part of the knowledge cluster—with nearly 200 qualified researchers, it is one of the 
largest research institutions of any kind in Sweden, and recognized as one of the 
internationally leading centers in its field. Research is also conducted at several of the 
industry’s smaller collective research institutes, such as the Institute of Surface 
Chemistry, the Graphical Research Laboratory, the Swedish Packaging Research 
Institute, and the Swedish Newsprint Mills’ Research Laboratory, to mention but a few 
of the dozens of research organizations that existed in this area in the late 1990s. 
In addition to the activities that take place in each of the research institutes, there has 
been an increase in collaborative research projects undertaken in various networks 
involving several of the industry institutes. For instance, a notable share of the 
industry’s present research is concentrated to three networks known under the acronyms 
T2F (printing technology), S2P2 (Surface Science Printing Program), and FSCN (Fibre   14
Sciences Communications Program). A fourth programme, BiMaC (BioFibre Materials 
Centre) includes both pulp and paper technology and wood technology. Each of these 
include academic institutes as well as industry research institutes and individual firms, 
each has a long term perspective on research, and is jointly funded by the state and the 
pulp and paper industry. Swedish research is world-leading in many of these fields, and 
the generation of knowledge in the pulp and paper industry is highly efficient in 
comparison with that undertaken in most other countries. To the extent that industry 
voices objections to this argument, the most typical complaint is that much of the 
knowledge created today is not yet relevant for the industry’s needs, and that it may take 
five to ten years before it will have any practical impact on operations (Ronne 1996). 
This is one indication of the excess capacity that is created in the short run—in the long 
run, some of this capacity is of course expected to contribute to the industry’s 
competitive advantages.  
Almost all of the industry’s research institutions are involved in the dissemination of 
research results, and it is generally assumed that technology transfer is highly efficient 
because the industry’s general level of education and skills is high. One reason is that 
the PPRI took the lead at an early stage in transferring skills from the academic 
institutions to the industry. To this end, the PPRI has acted on two fronts. On the one 
hand, it has attempted to stabilize the demand for engineers and researchers by 
recruiting skilled labour during slumps in the business cycle. These recruitment 
activities have largely been financed by the pulp and paper industry. On the other hand, 
PPRI has encouraged the industry to employ skilled labour, both by providing 
information about various types of education to the industry, and by influencing the 
content of higher education in the direction of the industry’s demand. The result has not 
only been efficient diffusion of skills and knowledge from academia and research 
institutes to the industry, but also increased demand for higher education from students: 
with good job opportunities, it has appeared to be safe to invest in long university 
programmes focusing on pulp and paper.  
In this regard, it can be argued that the innovation system in the pulp and paper industry 
makes up a model for other sectors as well. For instance, one commonly identified 
complaint in the wood products industry concerns a shortage of academically educated 
staff in sawmills and other firms (Ds 1991: 62). Without the necessary skills, companies 
are not able to keep pace with technological developments and changes in the 
competitive environment. Even if the research organizations manage to generate 
product and process innovations, there is a risk that few individual firms will recognize 
the opportunities and adopt the innovations. This problem is caused by the weak 
dissemination of skills from the universities to the industry: in the wood products 
industry, there is no institute playing the role of PPRI to promote the career prospects 
for advanced wood technology graduates. This notwithstanding, the existing knowledge 
cluster in the Swedish wood products sector is still more advanced than that found in 
most other countries (with the possible exception of Finland) and it has played an 
essential role in allowing that industry to adjust to the continuous changes of its 
competitive environment. 
One conclusion from this brief look at the forest industry’s innovation system is that 
excess capacity in the form of continuous investment in knowledge and skills is a 
precondition for long run competitiveness. In the forest industry it has been possible to 
foresee some of the major challenges, and it has therefore been possible to concentrate 
investments to the relevant areas. By focusing on two main objectives—to secure the   15
long run supply of raw materials and to generate the knowledge and skills needed to 
adjust product and process technologies to changing market conditions and increasing 
competition from new entrants in the global market—the industry has been able to reach 
and hold on to a leading position. The amount of skills and knowledge required to stay 
in the lead is very substantial: the leader has to respond faster than its competitors to the 
changes in the market environment. In the long run, this may be impossible without the 
flexibility afforded by knowledge and institutional capacity in excess of what is required 
to handle the current challenges. To remain competitive, the forest industry has been 
forced to become a knowledge-intensive industry.  
The transformation of the forest industry from a resource- to a knowledge-intensive 
sector also bridges the gap between the raw material-based industries that were crucial 
for the early stages of industrialization and the technology-oriented industries that form 
the core of today’s knowledge economy. In the Swedish case, there is no major contrast 
between the paper industry and, say, the telecommunications industry: the success of 
both requires efficient innovation systems and sophisticated technologies and 
knowledge. While the products of the forest industry may look simple, the production 
processes are not: a modern paper-making machine contains as much high-technology 
as an airplane. Hence, one of the insights from Swedish industrial development—from 
the industrialization process itself to the subsequent development and competitiveness 
of high-technology industries—is that human and institutional capacity determine long 
term success. Access to abundant supplies of raw materials is a blessing that may 
facilitate the development process. In combination with appropriate investments in 
knowledge and institutions, they may even become a permanent feature of a highly 
developed knowledge economy.  
3 The  welfare  state 
Although the state plays a more important role in Sweden than in most other 
countries—with over 50 per cent of the GDP channeled through the public sector—it is 
notable that the state is hardly involved in manufacturing or primary production. 
Instead, the main role of the Swedish state is related to welfare and redistribution 
(Kangas and Palme 2005). The Swedish welfare state is built on the principle that all 
residents have equal rights to education, health care, and social insurance, irrespective 
of their individual income, wealth, or social position. To guarantee access, the state has 
taken on the main responsibility for financing these services (but it is notable that the 
services are increasingly produced by private providers). Nearly two-thirds of 
government expenditures are therefore used for education, health care, social insurance, 
and redistribution. Although the costs for the welfare state are high, it has been possible 
to combine equity with growth and development. Sweden has not only managed to 
develop from one of Western Europe’s poorest countries to one of the most prosperous, 
but it has also performed relatively well in recent years. Economic growth has exceeded 
the EU average during the past decade, and unemployment has been low in a European 
comparison. Export competitiveness has been strong, with the aggregate world market 
share of goods and services growing over the past decade. Another indication of the 
overall competitiveness of the economy is that Sweden has been ranked among the top 
five countries in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report during 
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The history of the Swedish welfare state is closely connected to the country’s 
industrialization, in several ways. One link is that industrialization and the welfare state 
have some common roots. The new constitution established in 1817 reflected liberal 
thoughts that were important as a foundation for the industrial revolution during the 
second half of the century, but it also included political ideals from the French and 
American revolutions about human rights and freedom. Another link is found in the 
emphasis on knowledge and skills during the 19th century. The introduction of 
compulsory primary education and expansion of education at higher levels were not 
only valuable from the perspective of social rights and social mobility, but also a 
necessity for the development of industry. A small labour scarce economy like Sweden 
could not have industrialized without the concern for human capital. Most importantly, 
however, industrialization created a need for some type of a welfare state by raising the 
level of risk and uncertainty for individual households.  
As long as Sweden remained a primarily agricultural economy with the majority of the 
population in rural areas, there was little need for any comprehensive welfare state. In 
the pre-industrial society, the household was the center of social and economic activity, 
and the challenges facing individuals were primarily handled within the household. 
Most Swedish farmers were freeholders (unlike farmers in many other parts of Europe 
where feudal traditions were strong), and the fact that they controlled both their own 
labour and land meant that they had substantial flexibility regarding production 
decisions. This flexibility meant, for example, that each household member’s work 
input could be used productively, even if it did not amount to a full working day. Each 
household cared for its children and elderly, and although the work input of the oldest 
family members was often limited, it was important at the margin. For instance, elderly 
people contributed to household incomes by caring for the children, so that adults could 
devote their labour to farming and other productive activities. Technologies were 
simple, and the skills needed to sustain the farming system could be passed from parents 
to children.  
The role of the household was somewhat weaker in the cities, where the guilds took on 
some responsibility for education and social security and the state provided substantial 
security for public servants. However, Swedish cities were small before the industrial 
revolution. The most vulnerable groups—the landless, the disabled, orphans, widows, 
and others without a family—had some access to rudimentary social security through 
the public sector: in most cases, the church (which was intimately linked with the state) 
was responsible for basic social services. The great weakness of pre-industrial society 
was related to health. Specialized medical skills were rarely availably, many diseases 
could not be cured, and infant mortality was high. This was reflected in a low life 
expectancy, which did not reach 50 years until the end of the 19th century. 
3.1  Social welfare and industrialization 
The traditional social structure began to disintegrate with the industrialization process. 
The shift from subsistence-based farming to industrial production meant that households 
lost control of their working capital (i.e. their land). New vulnerabilities were created 
when former farmers began to work for entrepreneurs, who controlled the industrial 
capital stock and financed their investments by borrowing from banks and capital 
owners. In particular, it became difficult to adjust to situations where the external 
demand for labour diminished, and situations where a working household member fell 
ill—these cases led to income losses that threatened the livelihood of the household.   17
Job-related accidents were common, with severe consequences for the household. 
Urbanization made the situation of the elderly more exposed, since few households in 
the city had dwellings that allowed several generations to live together. Urbanization 
also had consequences for public health: infectious diseases were a more severe 
problem in densely populated cities than it had been in traditional agrarian societies. 
Education became more important as more specialized jobs were created. Those with 
suitable skills and capacities could find better jobs with higher incomes and more job 
security.  
There was no doubt that a stronger social protection system was needed, both for 
humanistic reasons, to provide a more secure livelihood for vulnerable population 
groups, and for political reasons, to maintain social stability. The widespread poverty 
that emerged each time the demand for labour diminished resulted both in increased 
social problems as well as political protests as workers began to organize. The limited 
social services provided by the church were insufficient to balance the higher risk level 
in society, and the government had no instruments to stabilize the swings in the 
economy that where driven by lags between investments and production or other 
variations in the business cycle.  
In 1843, the Swedish economist Jacob Lundell published an article where he suggested 
a new role for the government (see Olofsson 1997). His idea was that economic 
development could be smoother and more predictable if the government provided 
education and employment services, so that workers could more easily be allocated to 
sectors that demanded labour. Moreover, this would also result in a more equal 
distribution of prosperity, reducing social tensions. In other words, Lundell saw welfare 
institutions as a requirement for the development of the market economy. However, at 
that time, the dominant economic ideas had a bias towards a laissez-faire economy, 
where the state’s role was limited to protecting private property rights, and it would take 
more than 100 years before Lundell’s visions were realized. Still, the roots of the 
welfare state had been established already at this time. 
During the second half of the 19th century, economic inequality increased as market-
oriented agriculture and industrialization accelerated, and the expansion of international 
trade created vast fortunes among entrepreneurs and capital owners. As noted earlier, 
these achievements were related both to external demand and to fundamental reforms in 
the legal sphere, where new business laws were made and education at various levels, 
from primary schools to technical universities and colleges was enhanced. 
Developments in social policy were slower. Although workers began to organize in 
labour unions and political parties already from the 1880s, they had little influence at 
the policy-making level. One reason was that voting rights were related to ownership of 
real estate and property. At the beginning of the 20th century, only 10 per cent of the 
population was allowed to vote in national elections, and women had no vote at all. This 
notwithstanding, the labour organizations contributed to the establishment of voluntary 
unemployment and health insurance programmes, and put heavy pressure on employers 
to accept collective agreements in the labour market.  
The pressure from the labour unions and the Social Democratic party (which had been 
established in 1889) started yielding some results during the first decade of the 20th 
century. The first collective agreements, regulating not only wages but also working 
times and working conditions, were signed in 1905. The right for workers to organize in 
labour unions was established in an agreement the following year. Universal suffrage   18
for men was introduced in 1909. Women had to wait another ten years before they won 
the right to vote. The first steps towards the creation of a welfare state were also taken 
in the form of a universal pension insurance system introduced in 1913, and an 
insurance scheme for work-related injuries covering the entire work force in 1916. The 
establishment of general health insurance was also discussed at this time, but the plans 
were not realized for several decades because of the economic crisis following the First 
World War (Edebalk 2000).  
The economic plight caused by the war not only slowed further welfare reform, but it 
also sustained the tension between labour and capital, which had already resulted in 
several large strikes and lockouts during the first decades of the 20th century. However, 
the socialist revolutions in Russia and several of its border nations had a strong impact 
on the Swedish political landscape. The fear of a similar development motivated the 
Swedish conservative parties to seek collaboration with the main left wing party, the 
Social Democrats. This resulted in the improvement of labour conditions in the 
industrial sector, for example, a law limiting the working day to eight hours in 1919, 
and a law establishing the role of collective agreements a decade later. However, the 
Great Depression in the late 1920s complicated this type of collaboration. Industrial 
production contracted and unemployment soared throughout the world when countries 
turned to beggar-thy-neighbour policies and raised barriers to international trade and 
capital flows. In the Swedish case, the Great Depression culminated in a severe political 
crisis when the military opened fire on a labour demonstration in the village of Ådalen 
in 1931, killing five workers. The event strengthened the labour movement, and the 
Social Democrats advanced in the elections the following year, forming a coalition 
government with the agricultural party. In terms of national politics, this can be seen as 
another cornerstone in the creation of the Swedish welfare state.  
3.2  First steps towards a welfare state 
The new government acted in two areas. First, the Social Democrats were inspired by 
Keynesian ideas and introduced expansionary fiscal policies to maintain aggregate 
demand and reduce unemployment. The main areas for government-led employment 
programmes were infrastructure and housing construction in the growing cities. Second, 
important reforms were made in labour legislation, health care, education, and other 
social areas. These included increased pensions, voluntary unemployment insurance, 
statutory vacation, support to widows and orphans, and improvements in maternal 
health care. The new political climate was also manifested in labour market relations. 
From 1938, the labour unions and the employers’ federation institutionalized a system 
where wages and other labour market related issues (including some social insurance 
programmes) were negotiated at the central level. This system contributed to the 
consensus-based political relations that characterized the Swedish welfare state during 
the second half of the 20th century. It also contributed to a relatively high degree of 
income equality, since most wage agreements mandated a relatively small gap between 
the minimum and maximum incomes. 
The remaining building blocks of the welfare state were added after the Second World 
War. Sweden had not taken an active role in the war and the Swedish industrial sector 
was therefore intact when the war ended in 1945. The subsequent reconstruction of 
Europe led to a boom for the Swedish manufacturing sector. The combination of rapid 
economic growth, continued worries about social and labour market conflicts, and a 
social democratic government with close relations to the labour unions provided a solid   19
platform for further expansion of the welfare state. In particular, there was the belief 
that society could afford a more generous social security system. Another increasingly 
important political goal was to mitigate inequality. Consequently, new reforms were 
introduced during the decade following the Second World War. The Social Democratic 
government established a child allowance covering all children and housing and study 
allowances, a universal health insurance system was introduced, unemployment 
insurance was extended, pensions were reformed, education investments grew, and 
regional transfers were built into the system. Particular efforts—mainly related to the 
establishment of an extensive system of public childcare—were made to facilitate 
female labour force participation.  
To finance these reforms, taxes were increased to relatively high levels. The largest part 
of the tax burden was on labour (and consumption) rather than on capital (and 
production)—in fact, Swedish capital taxation was not very high in international 
comparison. Income taxes were progressive, emphasizing the egalitarian nature of the 
system. Apart from the healthy growth of the economy, the universal character of most 
welfare benefits was of utmost importance to explain the general acceptance of the 
increasing tax burden. The fact that most benefits were (and are) available for all 
residents in the relevant population group (irrespective of income) meant that tax payers 
could rely on receiving something in return for their taxes. For instance, most families 
understood that the expensive public childcare system was important both for female 
labour force participation (since women did not have to stay at home to take care of 
their children) and as a source of jobs. It is also important that Sweden avoided a 
situation where the poorest groups were at the mercy of the generosity of the ruling 
political elite. The emphasis on ‘rights’ rather than ‘benefits’ reduced social gaps and 
avoided the stigmatization that may follow from identifying ‘poor’ groups. Moreover, 
administrative costs were kept low since there was no need for targeting. The social 
stability that was created by the welfare state functioned very well for several decades, 
raising the income and living standard of the Swedish population to a top three position 
in the international per capital income list by the 1970s.  
At its height, in the early 1980s, the Swedish welfare state rested on three important 
core components: a public education system without tuition fees, a public health care 
system that guaranteed all residents the best available care with only nominal user fees, 
and a generous insurance system covering income losses due to unemployment, ill 
health, and old age. Over time, the views regarding the welfare state had changed, from 
the common attitude in the 1950s that it was a by-product of economic growth, to the 
view that the welfare state and its social security system is a requirement for economic 
growth and social stability.  
At the same time, for its sustainability, the system assumed a high level of economic 
growth and a high labour market participation rate. By the 1980s, it was increasingly 
clear that these assumptions were no longer appropriate. Decreased birth rates and 
longer life expectancy meant that an increasing share of the population was outside the 
labour force. The generous welfare benefits in combination with high personal income 
taxes may also have reduced the incentives for work. The result was a reduction in the 
growth rate of the economy, which put heavy pressure on the system. From the early 
1990s, a number of reforms were therefore introduced in order to re-establish the 
balance between costs and revenues. In particular, these focused on strengthening work 
incentives through a reduction in personal income taxes and cuts in the cost and benefit 
levels of the pension and health insurance programmes. However, the questions   20
discussed during the reform process did not concern the existence of the welfare state, 
but rather its form and organization. The common belief in Sweden is still that the 
welfare state is a prerequisite for stable economic and political development, and the 
economic recovery that has taken place during the past decade seems to corroborate this 
view.  
An early insight from the Swedish experience is that the optimal structure and nature of 
the welfare state varies with the characteristics of the economy. The economy’s growth 
rate and income level, the population structure, and the political structure are some of 
the variables that determine the shape of the welfare state. The solutions for different 
parts of the welfare system will also vary depending on these determinants. To illustrate 
some of these differences, the following sections briefly look at how the main building 
blocks of the Swedish welfare state—the education, health, and social insurance 
systems—have developed during the past century.  
3.3 Education 
The history of the formal education system in Sweden dates back about 1,000 years, and 
has its origin in the introduction of Christianity. The first schools were established by 
churches and monasteries to educate priests and other church officials. The so-called 
‘cathedral schools’, the oldest of which was established in Lund in 1075, also prepared 
students for university education abroad (mainly Paris and some of the first German 
universities). Sweden did not have any universities until the 15th century, but the 
cathedral schools in Lund and Uppsala gradually upgraded their standards and began 
providing higher education in the late Middle Ages. The oldest Swedish university, in 
Uppsala, was established in 1477, while Lund University was established in 1668. 
Aside from theology and law, the universities also had faculties of medicine and 
philosophy, but sciences did not take on a strong role until the second half of the 18th 
century. The development of higher education accelerated during the 19th century, 
when several new universities and technical colleges were established: as discussed 
above, these investments were largely related to the expected demand for skills in 
connection with the early stages of industrialization.  
Several institutions for education at lower levels had already been established by that 
time. A system of lower and upper secondary schools was set up in the early 17th 
century to replace the cathedral schools. The first law mandating some primary 
education was introduced in 1686. Each priest was responsible for educating his parish 
in Christianity, which included the ability to read the bible. A government resolution in 
1723 stated more explicitly that all parents should teach their children to read. The 
formal primary and secondary schools of this time were to a large extent financed by the 
municipalities and the church, and focused on the middle class. The primary and 
secondary education of the upper class was the responsibility of private teachers. The 
quality of teaching varied greatly, but the young men of the nobility were for a long 
time guaranteed seats in the academies irrespective of their educational background. An 
important step towards equality in higher education was taken in 1693, when university 
entrance exams were introduced for all prospective students. 
In 1842, Sweden introduced compulsory primary schooling, as noted earlier. Each 
municipality or parish was required to set up at least one school with at least one 
teacher, financed by the local authorities. State subsidies to primary schools in poor 
municipalities were introduced about one decade later. Although the education provided   21
by the compulsory primary schools was simple (and initially strongly influenced by the 
church), and although the rate of seasonal absenteeism was high (since children were 
needed as farm workers), it was successful in diffusing basic skills in reading, writing, 
and arithmetic. Within a few decades, almost the entire population was literate. Only a 
few per cent of the students continued to secondary school or other forms of higher 
education, but the relatively strong human capital base that was established contributed 
significantly to the rapid industrialization of the economy during the second half of the 
19th century.  
The following decades witnessed a gradual strengthening of the education system, with 
an extension of compulsory primary education to seven years, and several types of 
schools established at the secondary level, with theoretical as well as vocational 
orientation. Some of the secondary schools were financed by the state, while others 
were private. However, upper secondary education remained socially segmented until 
the end of the Second World War and the few students continuing to tertiary education 
were mainly from more affluent population groups. The main obstacles for students 
from poorer families were not the formal tuition fees, but rather the living costs and the 
opportunity costs in terms of foregone labour income.  
During the decades after the Second World War, public investment in education 
increased, with an expansion mainly at the upper secondary level. Compulsory 
education was extended to nine years, and efforts were made to promote higher 
education among students from less privileged backgrounds. Formal tuition fees were 
dropped and an extensive support system with subsidized student loans was introduced. 
The expansion of the education system was one of the main components in the 
construction of the Swedish welfare state. The effects were seen on a large scale during 
the 1960s, when university education began to expand rapidly as the cohorts from the 
1940s progressed through the education system.  
Today, the Swedish public school system is made up of a compulsory part covering nine 
years of primary and lower secondary education, and a non-compulsory part including 
kindergarten (for children below six years of age) and pre-school (for six-year old 
children), upper secondary school, and tertiary education.6 Almost all pupils continue 
directly to upper secondary schooling after the compulsory nine years and the vast 
majority of those graduate after three additional years. In 2002, 43 per cent of all pupils 
finishing an upper secondary level education continued to higher level studies 
(university).  
Primary and secondary education is free for all pupils.7 The government finances not 
only the education itself but also transport, books, and meals. It should also be noted 
that the opportunity costs of upper secondary education have been reduced dramatically 
during the past decades. In principle, decisions about upper secondary study do not have 
to take into account any foregone earnings from paid employment, since it is almost 
impossible to find a job in Sweden with only lower secondary education. Most 
universities and post-secondary institutions are run by the state and are also free of 
charge. However, at the tertiary level, meals, books and travel cost are not directly 
                                                 
6  Some adult secondary schooling programmes also exist within the public schooling system. 
7  There is a fee for childcare/kindergarten and pre-school for children below the age of six.   22
covered by the state, although all students qualify for subsidized loans to cover their 
living costs. 
There is a broad consensus in Sweden that education should be free and equally 
distributed to all citizens irrespective of location and family income. There are several 
reasons for this. First, there are no strong reasons to believe that pupils from richer 
families are generally more intelligent than pupils from poorer households. Therefore, 
from an economic efficiency point of view, with equal access to education the 
distribution of pupils to different programmes and subsequent job positions will be 
efficient. Moreover, from a social perspective, equal access reduces the social tensions 
that are likely to occur if only wealthier households have economic resources to send 
their children to school and subsequently to higher education. Hence, unequal education 
possibilities will not only lead to inefficient resource allocation, but may also trigger 
social conflicts that are harmful for the society as a whole. The Swedish domestic 
support for an ‘everything-included and free-for-all’ education system has not been 
seriously challenged since it was introduced in the 1950s.  
In total, the public expenditure on education amounts to almost 8 per cent of the GDP, 
which is among the highest levels in the world. Most of the funds are used for public 
schools and universities, but pupils are also free to attend independent schools that are 
often operated in accordance with some special pedagogic idea or by some specific 
interest group. These are also financed with public funds. 
During the 1990s, the concept of lifelong learning has received increased attention. The 
idea is that all adults should have the right to achieve a secondary level degree. A 
sufficient level of education gives people the possibility to participate more actively in 
society and rising levels of education may fill knowledge gaps. Moreover, with a 
relatively high minimum level of education, the possibilities to adjust the production 
structure according to a more knowledge-intensive economy are greatly improved. To 
achieve an increased education level among adults, a wide range of educational 
opportunities are available. The most important recent programme was a five-year 
project labeled the Adult Education Initiative launched in 1997. It is estimated that 
roughly 10 per cent of the total population benefited from this programme. The impact 
of the Adult Education Initiative is reflected in Table 3, which shows that the share of 
residents attending training programmes lasting at least four weeks was remarkably high 
in comparison with the EU average in the late 1990s. 
Table 3: Share of population aged 25–64 in training programmes, 1996–2001 (in per cent) 
  1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 
Sweden  26.5 25.0 25.8 21.6 17.5 
EU  5.7 5.8 8.2 8.5 8.4 
Note: Covers only programmes that are four weeks or longer.  
Source: Eurostat (various years, various issues). 
3.4  Public health care 
Health care and medical care form the second basic pillar of the Swedish welfare 
system. The principle underlying the Swedish health care system today is that health 
and medical care should be provided on equal terms and according to the need of each 
individual. The financing of health care is based on solidarity and not viewed as a   23
matter of social insurance, but rather as a matter of public interest. Hence, health care 
costs are mainly financed by taxes rather than fees or insurance. Overall, the public 
sector accounts for about 90 per cent of all health care expenditures, with private 
financing covering the remaining 10 per cent. The private share is mainly used for 
dental care and medicines, with formal user fees for health care only accounting for 
some 3 per cent of the sector’s total costs.  
The questions discussed in the Swedish health care debate are not mainly related to 
‘Who should pay?’, but rather focused on what level of health care services the public 
system should guarantee, and how the services should be organized and delivered to the 
public. These are critical issues, since there is a tendency for health care costs to 
increase over time. One reason is the changing population structure. In 1950, 10 per 
cent of the Swedish population had reached the age of 65. Today the corresponding 
figure is 17 per cent. Demographic predictions indicate that in 2030 nearly one-fourth of 
the Swedish population will be over 65 years old.  
It is estimated that the public expenditure per capita for retired people is about three 
times higher than for people in the labour force (Edebalk 2004). Although some of the 
differences are driven by the costs for pensions, it is also clear that medical care of the 
elderly is taking an increasing share of the budget. This is illustrated in Table 4 that 
shows how Swedish health care costs have developed over the past century. In the early 
20th century, health care was largely privately financed and public resources were used 
to support simple health care services for the very poorest. Life expectancy was low, 
largely because of improper nutrition and diseases. The lack of cures and medicines 
kept the health care budget relatively low. Over time, several parallel developments 
have occurred. New cures, equipment, and treatment methods have been developed and 
health care costs have increased in tandem. With an aging population these changes 
have made health care financing increasingly important. 
Table 4: Health, life expectancy, doctors, and income in Sweden, 1900–2000 














1900 0.6 51 n.a.  2,400 
1920 1.0 56 n.a.  3,400 
1940 1.9 64 n.a.  5,600 
1960 5.4 71 0.9  9,500 
1980 9.5 73 2.2  16,200 
2000 7.7 77 3.2  22,400 
Sources: LIF (2004), Statistics Sweden (various years, various issues), Socialstyrelsen (2001), OECD 
(2005), Edvinsson (2005). 
Until the Second World War, the financing responsibility remained largely with 
households, although various insurance systems were developed to reduce the financial 
risks connected to health problems. One exception was the area of public health. Given 
the limited budget resources of the state it was believed that costs for providing the best 
available care to all patients would simply have been prohibitive. A better way to use 
scarce public resources was to focus on prevention, to reduce the incidence of disease 
and ill health. Hence, the public health programmes introduced during the 1930s not   24
only focused on traditional areas, like primary health care and maternal health, but also 
on hygiene and sanitation, housing standards, and nutrition. However, after the end of 
the Second World War, health care became an issue with strong political connotations. 
Those who could afford treatments and medicines had a chance to get cured, while 
those who could not afford it were left suffering. This was clearly contrary to the 
egalitarian visions of the Social Democratic policy. During the 1950s, the responsibility 
for health care therefore shifted to the public sector. The introduction of universal health 
insurance in 1955 marks the completion of this transition. In its early stages, it included 
protection both for health care costs and for income losses during illness—over time, 
the financing of health care costs has shifted from health insurance to the central 
government budget. As a result, the health care sector has become highly centralized in 
terms of policies and financing.  
In 2002, the total cost for the Swedish health care sector amounted to over 9 per cent of 
the GDP. Roughly 20 per cent of the expenditures are directed to primary care. 
Specialized physical care accounts for roughly 60 per cent of total health care and 
medical expenditures. Another 10 per cent are used for specialized psychiatric care. The 
remaining share is used to cover expenditures for other health and medical care, dental 
care, and other activities, for example information campaigns (Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs 2005). While the total costs for this system may appear to be very high 
(in 2004, the per capita expenditure for health care exceeded USD 3,000), it is not 
remarkably high in comparison with other developed economies. In terms of costs and 
cost control, it appears that different institutional and organizational solutions seem to 
generate very different outcomes. Table 5 provides a comparison of health care costs 
and some health indicators for several advanced industrialized economies. It can be seen 
from the table that countries like the US have much higher health care costs, although 
neither the number of doctors per capita, life expectancy, nor the share of old people is 
any higher than in Sweden.  
Table 5: Health care: an international comparison, 2002 














79 years old 
(per cent) 
USA 14.6  44.4  2.4  77  3.3 
Germany 10.9  78.2  3.3  78  4.0 
France 9.7  76.3  3.3  79  4.1 
Sweden 9.2  85.2 3.0  80  5.2 
Italy 8.5  75.1  4.4  78  4.4 
UK 7.7  83.4  2.1  77  4.3 
Note:   Data refer to 2002 or closest possible year.  
Sources: LIF (2004), Statistics Sweden (various years, various issues), OECD (2002, 2005), Statistics 
Sweden (2005).   25
3.5 Social  insurance 
Over time, the Swedish welfare state has created two distinct social insurance systems.8 
There is one public insurance system and one negotiated system that is related to labour 
market participation.9 Public social insurance covers all residents of the country and 
provides a safety net in three different areas. The first area, parental insurance, is 
related to family policy, and aims to guarantee a reasonable standard of living for all 
children. It includes compensation for parents staying away from work to care for sick 
children, child allowances, and housing allowances for families with children below 18 
years of age. The second area is age related insurance, which aims to guarantee a 
reasonable standard of living for elderly people. The main item in this category is the 
national basic pension, but there are also widow's pensions, housing allowances for 
elderly with low incomes, and various early retirement programmes. The third large 
component is public health insurance, where the main goal is to provide compensation 
for the income losses related to sickness. The benefits include sickness allowance, 
temporary disability pensions, disability pensions, early retirement pensions, and 
industrial injury compensation.  
In terms of expenditures, the costs for the social insurance system amounted to about 17 
per cent of GDP in 2002. Of this, parental insurance accounted for 18 per cent, age 
related insurance accounted for 41 per cent, and public health insurance for 32 per cent 
(Statistics Sweden 2004). The social security system, which provides support for 
individuals and families with special problems (related e.g. to long term unemployment) 
accounted for the remaining costs of the social insurance system.  
Negotiated social insurance is built on agreements between the actors on the labour 
market. The negotiations are held at the central level (between representatives for the 
national labour unions and the national employers’ federation) and cover the 
participants in the labour force. The negotiated agreements are complementary to public 
social insurance, although the distinction between the two forms of insurance is not 
always clear. Negotiated social insurance covers areas such as compensation in case of 
disease and occupational injury, unemployment benefits, income-related old-age 
pensions and death benefits. 
The Swedish welfare system is mainly financed by various taxes (general taxes, taxes 
on employees, and taxes on employers). Table 6 shows how the costs of the social 
security system are divided between taxes on employees, employers and the government 
(central and local) in the form of general taxes (e.g. the value added tax) for a number of 
countries. 
                                                 
8  For a detailed description, see SOU (2001: 57). 
9  In addition, there is compulsory third-party traffic (liability) insurance.   26
Table 6: Financing of social insurance, 1960–1990 (per cent of total costs) 
  Taxes on employees  Taxes on employers  General taxes 
  1960  1990 1960 1990  1960  1990 
Sweden 45  4  10 81  44  15 
Finland 33  10 19 63  48  27 
Denmark  44 8 0 2 56  90 
Germany  47  43 41 43  12  14 
USA  28  26 72 73  0  0 
Source: SOU 2001: 57. 
The general pattern in developed economies is that the financing of the social insurance 
system is increasingly connected to taxes on employers, while the relative importance of 
general taxes is decreasing. This is largely explained by demography. Over time, the 
costs of the pension system have increased in line with the increasing life expectancy, 
and these costs—as well as the costs for unemployment and health insurance, which are 
becoming more important—are largely financed through the labour market.  
Parental insurance plays an important role for the Swedish model through its impact on 
the labour market: women are to a large extent employed outside of the household. The 
high labour market participation rate for women is considered important for two 
reasons: equality and tax revenue. Having independent income (that is taxed separately 
from their spouse’s income), women are able to become more independent than in 
systems where they depend on their husband. A high employment rate is also necessary 
to generate tax revenues to finance the welfare state. Given the ability of capital owners 
to move their resources to alternative locations—countries that offer lower taxes—
Sweden has avoided taxing capital, and instead focused on taxation of labour income 
and consumption (through the value added tax). 
The development of the pension system is an important illustration of the principle of 
universalism. In 1913, Sweden introduced a flat rate public pension system, which 
guaranteed a small annual monetary benefit to all elderly citizens. Although this so 
called ‘people’s pension’ was small—in the 1930s, it corresponded to only 9 per cent of 
the annual net income of industrial workers—it was important in two ways. First, it 
provided a limited but important financial contribution to all households with elderly 
members. The fact that the pension was not large enough to provide a sustainable living 
was typically not critical, since it was still common that children cared for their elderly 
parents. In many cases, particularly in rural areas, it was also important that it was a 
monetary contribution. Many rural households were subsistence-oriented, and pension 
funds made up a substantial part of their monetary purchasing power. Moreover, the 
poorest elderly people, e.g. those without relatives, could receive some supplementary 
support—over time, this supplement came to apply for the majority of retired people. 
Second, the pension was universal, setting a model for the subsequent development of 
the Swedish social insurance system in general. As noted earlier, universal benefits (that 
are not means tested) tend to provide a notable return to the middle class, who account 
for most of the financing in the form of tax payments. This helps to avoid situations   27
with a clear polarization between those groups that pay for public welfare and those that 
benefit from it (Edebalk 2000).  
During the decades after the Second World War, the pension system was gradually 
reformed through increases in the guaranteed ‘people’s pension’ and the addition of an 
earnings-related component that provided a higher pension to individuals whose tax 
contributions were larger.10 Prior to a large pension reform in 1959, the earnings-related 
supplement was close to zero but has grown increasingly important since that time. 
Table 7 shows how pension replacement ratios, i.e. pensions as a share of work 
incomes, have developed since 1930.  
Table 7: Pension replacement ratios in Sweden, 1930–2000 
Year  Average annual ‘people’s pension’ net 
of taxes as share of AIW income net of 
taxes  
Average public pension (including 
supplements) net of taxes as share of 
AIW income net of taxes 
1930 9%  n.a. 
1950 22%  n.a. 
1960 28%  28% 
1980 49%    72% 
2000 36%    62% 
Note: AIW = Average Industrial Worker. 
Source: Statistics Sweden (various years, various issues), Kangas and Palme (1989). 
A first point to note is the low replacement ratio for the guaranteed people’s pension 
until the 1960s. The low level of benefits was motivated by cost considerations: it was 
believed that these were the maximum levels that could be financed given the existing 
tax base. A second point is the increasing replacement rate for the total pension 
package, including the earnings-related supplement, until the 1980s.  
Until the 1990s, the system was in principle a pay-as-you-go plan, where the current 
contributors funded the pension payments to retired beneficiaries. However, it soon 
became clear that the combination of an aging population and decreasing productivity 
growth would put severe pressure on the system. It was estimated that the old pension 
plans would eventually have led to current pension expenditures exceeding 30 per cent 
of the GDP. The total tax burden needed to finance this would have created very 
substantial tax wedges, and resulted in large welfare losses due to even lower growth. 
There were also concerns about redistributive effects. More affluent population groups 
tend to study longer and live longer than poorer groups, and therefore pay during fewer 
years and collect pensions over a longer period. These observations suggest that pay-as-
you-go systems where the pensions are determined by the earnings during a few of the 
best (income) years may lead to redistribution of income from the poor to the rich. It 
was therefore clear that the system had to be reformed.  
                                                 
10 The main reform related to earnings-based pensions came in 1959, and was known under the acronym 
ATP – Allmän Tilläggs Pension (General Supplementary Pension).    28
After long debates, a fundamental reform was introduced in the early 1990s to establish 
a closer link between current payments and future benefits. For instance, the income-
related part of the pension is now based on the individuals’ total income during all years 
of labour market participation (rather than the last few years when earnings are typically 
highest), and there is no automatic adjustment to inflation, but rather to the average 
work income in society. The monthly amount of pension benefits is not guaranteed, but 
instead calculated on the basis of life expectancy. If the average life expectancy 
increases, the monthly amounts will have to be reduced. Individual pension accounts 
have also been established, and some of the funds are invested according to the 
individual choices of the policy holders. However, shifting from a pay-as-you-go 
system to a funded system cannot be done without putting an extra burden on some 
generations. During the transition process, the working population must not only fund 
the pensions of the elderly people who did not accumulate any resources for a fully 
funded system, but also accumulate funds for their own pensions. It is therefore not 
surprising that the Swedish replacement ratios have diminished since the 1980s, as 
shown in Table 7.  
Health insurance makes up the second largest component in the Swedish social 
insurance system, after retirement pensions. Health care costs are in principle covered 
through the general budget. The main function of the present health insurance is to 
protect against the income losses caused by ill health. Like many of the other major 
components of the Swedish welfare state, universal health insurance was introduced in 
the 1950s. Before that time—in fact, already from the 18th century—there had been 
various private health insurance plans covering parts of the population. Most of these 
were limited to members from specific professions or even specific companies (the most 
favourable conditions applied for state employees) although the first health insurance 
programme that was open to any paying member was set up as early as 1761 (Edebalk 
2005). The popularity of these programmes increased over time, but they left large parts 
of the population outside the system. For instance, in 1930, they only covered about 
one-fifth of the adult population (Edebalk 2005). By that time, the arguments for 
universal health insurance were widely discussed. In 1919 a government committee 
proposed that a compulsory programme should be introduced. The proposal was 
rejected with reference to weak public finances, but it reappeared in the late 1930s, and 
eventually led to the introduction of a universal health insurance plan in 1955.  
Apart from covering health care costs, it provided compensation for income losses: 
initially, after the first three days of illness, the compensation was about 55 per cent of 
the lost income. During the following decades, the rules were gradually made more 
generous, and by the late 1980s, the insurance covered 100 per cent of the income losses 
from the first sick day, with only a small reduction in benefits if the illness lasted for 
more than three months.  
Although the generous health insurance benefits that developed during the 1970s and 
1980s were commendable from a social perspective, they turned out to be very costly. 
During the 1950s, when benefit levels were relatively low, the average number of 
compensated sick leave days per worker was ten to 15 days per year. By the late 1980s, 
this had increased to over 30 days, in spite of great improvements in job safety and 
environmental conditions. This contributed to very substantial costs, not only in terms 
of insurance payments, but also in the form of lost production and lower growth rates. 
The accelerating costs triggered an intensive debate on the reasons for the apparent 
deterioration of public health and on the design of an optimal insurance system. Several   29
arguments have been proposed as explanations for the increased number of sick leave 
days. Some commentators have focused on increased stress and uncertain employment 
conditions. Others emphasize the changing composition of the labour force. Women and 
elderly have more sick leave days than young men, and the share of females and elderly 
in the labour force has increased steadily since the 1950s. There is also a well 
established relation between the business cycle and the number of sick leave days: when 
the economy is booming and unemployment is low the number of sick days increases.  
However, maybe the most intensively debated issue concerns how the incentives for 
work are related to the level of compensation in the social security system. Henrekson 
and Persson (2004) analysed Swedish data spanning the period 1950–2000 and found a 
positive relation between the level of sick leave days and the compensation level. The 
question suggested by their findings is: what is the optimal level of sick leave 
compensation? If the compensation is too generous, it may contribute to a climate where 
it is considered more or less ‘normal’ to take sick leave even for minor ailments. On the 
other hand, a low compensation level may force workers to drag themselves to work 
although they are ill, thereby weakening their own health and passing on infections to 
their colleagues. In the Swedish case, there was a substantial reduction in the 
compensation level in 1991, and frequent changes in the rules between 1993 and 1998. 
These adjustments reflect both the fact that health insurance is politically sensitive, and 
that health expenses constitute a heavy burden on public finances. Hence, the benefits 
have been less generous when the public budget has been under pressure (in particular, 
during the financial crisis in the early 1990s), but attempts have been made to restore 
compensation levels when the financial situation has been less severe.  
4  Lesson and conclusions 
The Swedish model of economic development—the combination of an efficient and 
knowledge-intensive market-oriented economy and an active welfare state—has 
received much attention in the international debate as a possible ‘middle way’ providing 
both efficiency and equity. This paper has described some of the roots of the Swedish 
model, outlining the evolution of both industry and welfare state in Sweden over the 
past two centuries. Two broad conclusions emerge from the analysis. 
First, the initial success of Swedish industrialization and the subsequent development of 
industrial competitiveness are largely the results of intentional policies and strategies 
implemented by the state and individual companies. By investing heavily in institutional 
capacity, knowledge, and skills, Sweden has created the capacity to take advantage of 
new opportunities and to adjust to changing conditions in the global market. The policy 
lessons from these experiences are clear. Countries aiming for growth and sustainable 
development—or just to maintain their relative competitiveness in the international 
market—need to invest continuously in institutional and human capacity. When 
opportunities arise or market conditions change, it is mainly the actors that have excess 
capacity who are able to respond positively to the changes. 
Second, while the need for a welfare state was clear at an early stage of industrialization 
and development—to balance the increased risk and uncertainty when household-based 
production systems were replaced by urban industrial systems—it took a long time to 
construct a comprehensive welfare state. The development of the various components of 
the welfare state was gradual, and closely related to both needs and financial capacities. 
The earliest components of the welfare state, such as compulsory education and   30
insurance schemes, were closely connected to the industrialization process itself: 
literacy, insurance for work-related accidents, and unemployment insurance are 
necessary for successful industrial development. Subsequent developments were largely 
driven by political pressures. The socialist revolutions in Eastern Europe after the First 
World War had a strong impact on the political climate in Sweden, and contributed to a 
stronger emphasis on the public provision of social welfare. The early welfare state was 
not very generous because of the limited financial resources of the state, but the level of 
benefits increased from the 1950s and onwards, as the rapidly growing economy made 
the country more prosperous. Later on, after the 1980s, changing demographic and 
economic conditions have mandated an adjustment in the opposite direction: benefit 
levels have been adjusted downwards because of the mismatch between limited tax 
revenues and increasing costs for health care and pensions.  
To be useful for the policy debate in today’s developing countries, these two 
conclusions need to be complemented with some additional questions: why did the 
Swedish state begin to build institutional and human capacity already before it was 
absolutely necessary? In other words, why did the Swedish state become a 
‘developmental state’ long before the term was established in the academic discourse? 
Why did the Swedish welfare state become so comprehensive, when other European 
countries, which faced similar industrial and political pressures, chose to invest much 
less on social welfare? How has the Swedish population come to accept the high tax 
rates required to sustain the welfare state? 
Discussing the motives for the institutional changes during the 19th century, Myhrman 
(1994) argues that an important reason was the spread of liberal ideas in Swedish 
politics that had started already in the late 18th century. The period 1772–1809 was 
characterized by absolute monarchy, restrictions on public debate, and two major wars 
with Russia. The wars were not only unsuccessful from a military and political 
perspective—for instance, Finland was lost to Russia in 1808–9—but the large public 
expenditure for the wars also led to high inflation and economic chaos. The 
dissatisfaction with the monarch led to a coup d’état, the appointment of a new king, 
and a new constitution. This new constitution stipulated a division of power between the 
monarch and the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament, and drew on ideas from the 
American and French revolutions. It also gave more political influence to interest 
groups promoting liberal ideas and commercial ambitions. Many of the institutional 
reforms introduced during the following decades seem to have been driven by 
comparisons with the leading industrial nations in Western Europe: if it could be done 
in England, then why not in Sweden?  
While some developments were based on the existing domestic institutional framework, 
there were also cases where foreign solutions were imported. One example is the 
expansion of science and technical education, where the French and German models, 
already introduced at the end of the 18th century, provided much of the inspiration. 
Interpreting these events in light of the current debate on innovations and knowledge 
management, this may be described as an early example of benchmarking. 
Regarding the development of the welfare state, the perhaps most important 
characteristic is its universal nature: many benefits are available on equal terms to all 
residents. As noted above, this principle was established already in the old age pension 
programme of 1913, and has characterized most of the developments since that time. By 
defining universal benefits, it has not been necessary to identify those groups that are   31
considered particularly weak or vulnerable. This has made it possible to avoid a 
polarization of the population into those that pay for social security and those that draw 
on the benefits of the system. Instead, all residents are net payers during some part of 
their life cycle, and net beneficiaries at other times. It has also been important for 
creating acceptance for the increasing tax burden that is needed to finance public 
welfare: people have largely been prepared to pay their high taxes as long as they have 
felt that their social welfare needs were met. 
To explain why Sweden chose to focus on universal benefits, Kuhnle and Hort (2004) 
point to several contextual factors that have favoured universalism. These include early 
institutional structures, cultural homogeneity, and the egalitarian pre-industrial society. 
The fact that the church and state had been merged since the 1500s meant that the early 
social welfare programmes, which had traditionally been managed by the church, were 
easy to integrate with the state’s new programmes. In other parts of Europe, it was less 
clear how the division of labour between the church (or between several different 
churches) and the state should look.  
Cultural homogeneity made it difficult to exclude any particular population group from 
welfare programmes. The traditionally strong independent peasant class also contributed 
to broad solutions that did not exclude any large population groups. The farmers’ party 
had substantial political influence in the early industrial era, and blocked welfare 
programmes that would have had an exclusive focus on industrial workers.  
Rojas (2005), Carroll and Palme (2006), and Palme (2009) also emphasize these 
historical roots of universalism. In particular, they note that the Social Democrats 
needed the support of the Agrarian Party when they took power in 1932 (subsequently, 
Sweden was governed by the Social Democrats until 1976). One consequence of this 
political union was that the broader welfare programmes that were designed during the 
1930s became universal. Rojas (2005) also points to an even more important 
consequence of the need to compromise with agrarian interests. He argues that the 
Swedish Social Democrats gave up the ambition to socialize productive capital, and 
instead decided to balance the power of the capitalists by focusing on social welfare 
provided through the state. The capitalists were welcome to ‘rule in their industrial 
castles … but elsewhere the Party and the Movement would rule’ (Rojas 2005: 22). 
Hence, the egalitarian welfare state replaced old visions of the socialist economy or 
command economy as the objective and ideal of Swedish Social Democracy.  
This observation motivates a third broad conclusion from the Swedish experience of 
growth and development. It is hard to overestimate the importance of social stability. 
Although the first decades of the 20th century were characterized by a struggle between 
labour and capital, it resulted in a broad political compromise that has survived to the 
present. The outcome has been an unusual degree of political stability, where the overall 
character of society is not likely to change much even if political power shifts from one 
of the main political parties to another. This stability, in turn, guarantees that the rules of 
the game are predictable and that the degree of uncertainty for long term investors is 
low.  
To what extent can today’s developing countries aim to replicate any of these 
experiences? It is clear that many of the policies used to create capacity for 
industrialization and competitiveness are well within the reach of many developing 
economies. Investments in institutional capacity and human capital are not   32
controversial, and the argument that investments should be made before they are acutely 
needed is powerful. Benchmarks are also readily available, both in the form of historical 
experiences from developed nations and current models from relatively successful 
developing economies, e.g. in East Asia. The political decisions needed to establish the 
foundation for a welfare state are more difficult to replicate. However, a key decision 
seems to be the one between targeted and universal benefits. Swedish experiences 
indicate that universal welfare programmes do not necessarily lie beyond the means of 
poor countries: the benefit levels can be adjusted to available budgets. Moreover, the 
returns from universal systems can be substantial, particularly if they contribute to 
reducing tensions between social groups and establishing conditions for more 
predictable long term policies. 
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